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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SUPRANATIONAL FEDERALISM:
A STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Neha Jain
Introduction
The need for, and the nature and efficacy of, federalism as a system of governance have remained
evergreen issues in comparative constitutional law. Its significance is established by one simple factor:
over one billion people today live in states that are considered to be, or claim to be, federal. Today, in
the context of globalization, the idea of the nation-state is changing both in terms of its status in
international law and its internal governance systems. In examining federalism within the framework of
globalization, the process of European integration and the creation of the European Union ("EU"),
which has blurred the distinction between an international organization and a federal supervisor,
assume special significance. This paper critically reviews the process of formation of the EU in light of
generally accepted principles of federalism. In the following section, the process of the formation of the
EU and its current position are discussed. The next two sections test the structure of the EU against the
fundamental principles of federalism. The paper concludes that the EU cannot be called a federation in
the generally understood sense, but that, nevertheless, there are valuable lessons to be learnt from the
process of European integration.

The Process of European Integration
Early Stages
One of the necessary prerequisites for European integration to take place must have been a desire and a
capacity of the Member States of the EU to unite and yet retain independent control in certain areas.
The factors that prompted this were the economics of integration. Following World War II, Germany,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg began laying the framework for a European
polity with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), the European
Atomic Energy Community, and the European Economic Community (both in 1957). In the decades
that followed, the Member States transferred increasing elements of their sovereignty to the European
institutions. Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United
II Year B.A., LLB.(Hons.) Student, National Law School of India University
The list includes Canada, the United States, and Mexico in North America; Brazil, Venenuela, and Argentina in
South America; Austria, Belgium, Germany, Switzerland, and Russia in Europe; Australia, India and Malaysia in Asia;
and Nigeria in Africa. For an analysis of the development of the federal idea in different parts of the world, see
Ronald L. Watts, Fe&ralim in ehePost Cold-ar Era: The Contemporar Reknae of the Federal Ida, ST. Louts - WARsal
TRANSAm.A"nc L J, 109,110-119 (1995).
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This fact is evident from the current structure of the EU, as will be demonstrated during the course of this paper.
While integration, as far as economic matters are concerned, is at a fairly advanced stage, in respect of political
matters, there is still a reluctance to move cowards any integration,
1 Dieter Kugelmann, The Mastrit Trwo and Me Dos* of a European Fewkral State, 8 TaMP. TNTL & Cowis. L. j 335, 337
(1994); Mark K. Brewer, Tke Empnyw Umion ad Lgdmacy: Time fir a Europta Conisdiwn 34 CORNELL INVL L J 555,
558 (2001).
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Kingdom all joined the evolving European order. The vision of the process that started in 1951 was to
move progressively through the steps of establishing a common market and approximating economic
policies through tighter economic integration, and economic and monetary union, resulting finally, in
4
full political union, in some version of a United States of Europe.
Maastricht
The aim of establishing a common market and a monetary union found their culmination in the Single
European Act, 1986 ("SEA"), and the Maastricht Treaty Establishing the European Community, 1992.
The idea of the single market was presented in the 1985 EC White Paper (a background to the SEA) as
an ideologically neutral programme around which the entire European polity would coalesce in order to
achieve the goals of European Integration. The aim was to create an area without internal frontiers in
which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital was ensured. To realize this goal,
European leaders committed themselves to addressing issues that were never successfully tackled in a
constitutional forum, such as the comprehensive liberalization of trade in services and the removal of
domestic regulations that acted as non-tariff barriers. This was coupled with procedural reforms to
streamline decision-making in the governing body of the European Community ("EC"), the Council
of Ministers, by expanding the use of qualified majority voting, on matters pertaining to internal
markets. Maastricht took economic integration a step further by providing a common central bank and a
single currency, the European Currency Unit, thus creating the European Monetary Union ("EMU'".
The EU Structure Today
The European Union is built on an institutional system that is the only one of its kind in the world. There
are four bodies in the EU that are relevant to this paper: the European Parliament, the Council of the
European Union, the European Commission, and the European Court ofJustice. The Council is the
WEII.ER, THE CONSTITLTION OF IEuRoPE- DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN E.PEROR? 91 (1999). Admittedli, the use of
the word "vision' is misleading in so far as it brings to mind an image of individual citizens of the member Stares
of the EU actually desiring such a union. In fact, the formative years of the EU were extremely undemocratic - a
criticism that his been extended to its current functioning as well. See Sean Monaghan, Emapean Unio LegA/

. J.H.H.

Persno6a Dnonfer The Uniont LY Namer Threh the Prirm of the Germs Feleral Conrdtionol CourtS Maastricht
Dedeni, 12 E.UoRy IMY'% L Rrx. 1443, 1468 (1998). For a contrary view on the EU's current functioning stle, ire
Herbert Schambeck, Federru in the Part-Cakf War Era: The Regional Dixenura lrithin Ahe Enwean Union: Prpects Jor
l
L. J. 149 (1995). See general Rainer Arnold, FaIemkm and Lripeanr
Stailip and Pear, Sr. Los is - WasAW TsRA sAneNr
Community Law. A Study on he Mnhanirms of Intrnsal Pardialion in European CoIssonity Deaden Making in Geranw,
Ashia, and Beoimn, 12 TU ANE Eta. & Ov, L. F. 159 (1997). It would be useful to contrast the federal structure of

the United States of America wntt the current atructure of the European Union The United States essentinlly
consists of autonomous units with some federal obligations, all under one supreme political authority. This was

5

the iniual idea behind European integration as well. However, the lack of any desire for the acceptance of a
common political authority among Member States, and in some cases, any further steps whatsoever towards
greater union, have led to the stalemate that exists today.
This is the single most important document in the context of European integration. In this paper, it is referred to
as the "Maastricht Treaty", "Miastricht, the "E.C. Treaty", or simply the "Treaty"
WErIEn, spro note 4, at 88.
Andrew Moravcsik, Nadaling the SEA: Nanal Interst and Conenidonal Staleefi in Ike European Commnntyr, 45(1)
1sit ORG. 19, 20 (1991)
Wayne Sandholtz, Chmang Unon: Mantor, Poder and Afast , 47(1) IvTrL Oao. 1 (1993).
There is one other body, the Court of Auditors, which is not relevant for this paper. Besides these five bodies.
the EU has certain other important organizaticos: the Economic and Social Committee and the Commirnee of the
Regions (advisory bodies which help to ensure that the positions of the EU's various economic and socisl

categories and regions respectively are taken into account), the European Ombudsman (dealing with complaints
from ciizens concerning misadministration at the European level), the European Investment Bank (EU financial
institution) and the Europcan Central Bank (responsible for monetary policy in Europe)44
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most powerful body in the EU. All Member States are represented through their governments. According
to the matters on the agenda, the Council meets in different compositions: foreign affairs, finance,
education, telecommunications, etc. The Council has a number of key responsibilities: It is the Union's
legislative body ; for a wide range of EU issues, it exercises that legislative power in co-decision with the
European Parliament in the form of directives and regulations. It coordinates the broad economic policies
of Member States. It concludes, on behalf of the EU, international agreements with one or more states or
international organizations. It shares budgetary authority with the Parliament. It takes the decisions
necessary for framing and implementing the common foreign and security policy. It coordinates the
activities of Member States and adopts measures in the field of police and judicial cooperation in criminal
11
matters. The European Parliament is second, in order of importance. It is elected by direct elections
carried out throughout the EU with all major political parties of the Member States contesting. It shares
legislative and budgetary control with the Council, appoints members to the Commission and exercises a
general democratic supervision over all the bodies. Compared to an ordinary Parliament, however, its role is
12
largely titular. The Commission is the EU's executive body and is responsible for implementing
European legislation, budget, and programmes adopted by the Parliament and the Council. It has the right
to initiate draft legislation, and represents the Union on the international stage, and negotiates international
13
agreements, chiefly in the field of trade and cooperation. The European Court of Justice ('ECJ") ensures
that European Community law is uniformly interpreted and effectively applied. It has jurisdiction in
14
disputes involving Member States, EU institutions, businesses, and individuals. A Court of First
Instance has been attached to it since 1989. Since the ECJ had one of the most influential roles in the
federalization of Europe, its role is discussed in detail later in this paper.

Federal Aspects of the European Union
The various characterizations of the legal nature of the EU fall under three broad umbrellas. First, there
are those in Europe and the United States who equate progress towards European integration with the
15
formation of a federal state. Second, some scholars emphasize the intergovernmental nature of the
EU, its most relevant analogue being a treaty organization. Third, many argue that the EU is a sin
generi organization, consisting of a hybrid set of supranational relationships existing between the
17
national and supranational levels. It would be helpful to understand the reasons for the integration of
Europe, before engaging in an analysis of the federal aspects of the EU.

All these powers are granted under the E.C. Treaty.
Articles 202-210 of the EC Treaty spell out the powers of the Council. SeegAeternl David O'Keefe, Current Les in
Eropean Inegration, 7 PACE INT'L L. REv. 1 (1995).
Articles 189-201 of the 7C Treaty deal with the powers of the European Parliament.
Articles 211-219 of the EC Treaty deal with the powers of the Commission,
The powers and jurisdiction of the 129 are laid down in Article 220-245 of the EC Treaty.
This process has been described as the "constitutionalizarion" of Europe. SewDennis J. Pdwards, Frating Federaim's
Fi/ure: Subsidiant in the Eurneyan Union, 44 As'. I CoiN. L 537 (1996); Deiter Kugumann, The Maasichi Treai and /e
Deign of a European FederalState, 8 TEMP. iNTI.. & COw. L.J. 335 (1994).

Many German scholars reject the assertion that European Integration is progressing towards the establishment of a
stare-like entity For example, at an annual conference of German public law professors, there was a widespread
consensus that the EU lacks legal personality and that it is not becoming a federal State tied fm Sean C Managhan.

"

EU Legal Peronaiy Disorder: The Union' 14pr/ Nolmy Thrigh the Pism of the German Federal Conritntional Conri&
Afndntncki Dedeis, 12 Eiany tNWT.. L. R. 1443, 1472 (1998).
STPHrN WRATHERHITL., LAw AnD INTEGRATION IN THE EuloiPAN UNiON 185 (1995), Ian Ward, IdeniyandDffernce: TheEproan
Union andFoimodenismin Nar LGAL DxNAics OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 15 (o Shaw & Gillian More eds., 1995).
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The Appropriate Model for Analysis
The most dominant model for studying the process of European Integration is the neo-functionalist
model pioneered by Ernst Hass, in his study, The Uniting of Europe . Neo-functionalism describes a
process whereby
"poicalactors in distinct naonal settings are persuaded to shift their Ayalts, expectations
and potcal adwides towards a new and arger anre whose instAtons possess and demand
jnrisduion ovr the pre-exiing national state."' 9
According to the theory, the key political actors in the process of European Integration exist both above
and below the nation-state. Actors below include interest groups and political parties. Actors above the
nation-state are supranational regional institutions. In this process, the role of governments is "aradfrl
m sponsiW.'f Governments may either choose to or feel constrained to yield to the pressures of
converging supranational and subnational interests. It will be immediately obvious that this model of
neo-functionalism is inappropriate to study federalism in India (or in any other country). There were no
political actors of any significance above the nation-state tobe formed who influenced the creation of a
federation. Thus, even before embarking upon the examination of the process of European
integration, the difficulties in comparing it with any other model come to the fore.
Supranational interests
Some experts argue that the economic and political factors behind the success of the SEA and Maastricht
were mainly active at the supranational level. These included European institutions, for example the
so-called Crocodile Group in the European Parliament, which advocated European federalism and
broad expansion in the scope of EC activities, backed by procedural reforms focussing particularly on
increasing the powers of the Parliament; transnational business groups, hoping to increase the
competitiveness of European firms by calling for a more liberal EC marker; and international political
leaders, like Jacque Delors, who became the President of the European Commission in 1985 and

pushed for reform in three areas - the EC decision making institutions, European monetary policy, and
political and defence collaboration.23

National Interests of Member States
However, the predominant national economic and political interests which pushed for integration, are,
perhaps, more significant than supranational interests in both the SEA and Maastricht. In the case of
the SEA, as Europe's leading exporter, Germany profits directly from economic integration. Yet, in the
1980s, Germany was opposed to further monetary integration till capital flows were liberalized. In
France, with the ascendancy of Francois Mitterand to the presidency, in 1984, French negotiators began
to support internal market liberalization and collaborated research and development ("R & D").
Although committed to using the EC to combat economic decline, the French Government remained

L HAAs, THE UNnxc or Enovr: PouicAl, SOCIAr. ANf rEoMicFORCES 1950-1957 (1958).
ERS
" Anne Marie Burley & Walter Matte, Ewpe befn the Comr A Pokral Theory of Ler/ INmAatio, 47(l) INT'L ORG. 507,
514 (1993).
" Id at 517. The expression has been borrowed from REGINALD HARRISO%, ELKoP IN Qtrsno%. THEoRrs Or RFCoNA.
"

INTERNA1oN.ar. INTEGRATioN

80 (1974).

Id at 515.
Idar 517
"
2I

Wrii,

pm

15

nore 4 at 23.

at 28.
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unsure about whether monetary policy, internal market liberalization, or collaboration in R & D should
be at the heart of the new initiative. The most important British objection to the EC policy stemmed
form the heavy British deficit under the Common Agricultural Progranme ("CAP'). Britain gained little
from the agricultural programmes that comprised 70% of the EC budget. At the same time, Britain was
26
by far the largest perapitanet contributor to the budget. A series of compromises were effected under
President Mitterand, like the cutting down of the British net contribution to reflect its lower per capita
income. A breakthrough was achieved at the Fontainebleau summit of 1984, which prioritized
liberalization of internal markets, particularly in all the services. This finally culminated in the SEA.
The considerations with regard to the Treaty of Maastricht were as follows. The benefits of a monetary
union with a single currency are manifold: a single currency would constitute the most credible
commitment to low inflation. The price stability would lead to increased investment and would provide
the basis for higher growth and employment. A single currency would eliminate exchange rate risk and
the transaction costs of changing currencies in the BC market.
The reasons for the policy decisions of the various countries were several. Firstly, integration in one area, ie.,
a single market process, would reveal functional linkages to others. Therefore, a desire to obtain the full
benefits of integration in the first area would lead to pressure for integration in the linked monetary
sector. Secondly, a monetary union received political support from business groups. Thirdly, France and
other states wanted a greater voice in community monetary policy-making than they enjoyed in the market
system, which was seen as being dominated by Germany. German support for the project was largely
political and guided by its foreign policy objectives. A desire to commit to further integration was a vital was
of proving that Germany would remain a loyal Community partner, especially in the context of the fears
29
raised, following German unification. An important part in this was also played by favourable public
opinion about the EU, which was a vital factor throughout the integration of Europe. For instance, Irish
and Danish referenda in 1972 led directly to EC membership, while the Norwegian voters chose to stay
outside the Community. The 1975 British referendum resolved a long-standing debate on Britain's entry
into the EC by popular voice vote. Direct elections to the European Parliament have further
institutionalized the publics role by providing citizens a voice in the governing of the EC
The Constitutionalization of Europe
There is no single accepted model of federalism. However, the three essential features of any federation
- existence of a federal authority and regional authorities, a written supreme constitution, and an
independent judicial body3 - are found in the EU model. The first and the third requirements are met
by the existence of bodies such as the Council, the Parliament, and the European Court ofJustice. As
for the second, it has been argued that Maastricht created at least a nascent federal system of

Idat 30.
aIdt32.

Ida 37.

Idat 19.
Id at 33.

Richard C. Eichenberg & Russell J. Dalton, Eovpeans and he Eronmic Commawni: The Drnamic of Pldc Supportfor
Enpwean Ilandeno 47(1) 1l7L Ono. 501. 518 (1993).
1C WHrAxr, Fmnrtt rwrENMEl%-r 14 (1963); SrabsID. ILcCHEK, COMPArEVE FEDEMUSM 194 (1970)
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government. It is in this regard that the ECJ has played an extremely influential role. The main
arguments to consider the EU as a federation have come from various judgments of the ECJ, which
have imported several doctrines of constitutional law into European Community law. The most
important factor here is that the ECJ - like any other federal apex court and unlike the International
Court of justice - has the power of judicial review, Either the Commission or an individual Member
State may, in accordance with Articles 226 - 247 of the E.C. Treaty, bring an action against a Member State
for failure to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty. Article 234 of the Treaty provides that when a
question concerning the interpretation of the Treaty is raised before a national court, that court may
suspend the national proceedings and request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on the interpretation
of the Treaty. Primafade, the purpose of Article 234 is to ensure the uniform interpretation of
Community law throughout the Member States. However, frequently, the factual situation in which
Article 234 comes into play involves an individual litigant who pleads in a national court that a rule,
measure, or national practice should not be applied because it violates the Community obligations of
the Member States. In such a case, the Court provides the national judge with an answer in which
questions of law and fact are sufficiently mixed so as to leave the national judge with little discretion and
flexibility in making his decision. Certain important doctrines emerging from judgments of the EC)
that make the EU resemble a federation are now considered.
The cornerstone for the constitutional evolution of the doctrine of direct effect was the ECJ's judgment in
the Van Gendcase, in which the question was whether Article 12 of the ECC Treaty was directly applicable
within the territory of a Member State, i.e., whether nationals of such a State could, on the basis of the
Article, lay claim to an individual right which the courts protect. In this case, the Court declared that
Community legal norms that are clear, precise, and self-sufficient must be regarded as the law of the land in
the sphere of application of Community Law. Direct effect applies to all actions producing legal effects in
the Community- the Treaty itself and secondary legislation. The analogy with a federal law applying direcdly
in the regons, contrasted with treaty law that needs to be incorporated, is striking.
In Costa, the Court held that a national law, whether adopted before or after the effective date of the
Treaty could not take precedence over Community law, and thereby evolved the doctrine of direct
supremacy. The Court declared that "the integraion" of the community's own system into the laws of
each Member State, and more generally, "the terms and spirit of the Tay", made it impossible for the
States, as a corollary, to accord precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system
accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity.
In the ERTA case, the ECJ held that the grant of internal competence laid down by the Treaty must
be read as implying an external treaty-making power. Community international agreements would be
binding not only on the Community as such, but also, as appropriate, on and within the Member
States. Furthermore, the Treaty does not contain a Bill of Rights and there is no explicit provision for
udicial review of an alleged violation of human rights. Starting from the Stander case, the ECJ asserted

"

Se grmn4, sipn note 15.
Scan Monaghan, Em-qpean Unon Lpl Permnah Dionir-. The Uion' LA/ Natre Thranh the Prism of the German ederal
Consrutbhonal Caric Maastricht Deanon, 12 ttanr I1T' L_L.Rv. 1443, 1470 (1998)
NV A emene Tranqport-en Expadioe Ondrrnming Van Grad & Lm; v. Neandse Adniastrat der Brikshkgn, j1963)1 ECR I
Flaminio Cota v. ENEL, 119641 ECR 585.
Cowwision of the Eurpean Commarnries v. Conmil of 6, European Cwmnnidst, [1971] ECR 263.
Erich Staler v. Cr of Ulm, Soidarl, 11969] BCR 419.
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that it would, nonetheless, review Community measures for any violation of fundamental human
rights, adopting for its criteria the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and the
international human rights conventions to which the Member States were parties.

Other Factors Supporting the Federation Argument
The Principle of Implied Powers
Another doctrine that is especially important in the context of a federal Europe is the doctrine of
implied powers. The Treaty broadly stipulates the material limits of Community jurisdiction. The
original understanding was that the principle of enumeration would be strict, and that jurisdictional
39
enlargement could not be lightly undertaken. The reason was that the Council was seen as an intergovernmental organization that did not have the power to create its own jurisdiction. However, in the
1970s and the early 1980s, the principle of enumerated powers as a constraint on Community material
40
jurisdiction was substantially eroded, and virtually disappeared in practice. This mainly happened
through an extension of the doctrine of implied powers, most strikingly illustrated in the interpretation
of Article 308 of the Treaty. Article 308 provides that:
"if action by the Community shouldprove necessary to attain, in the course of the operation of
the Common Market, one of the objectives of the Communip, and this Treaty has not provided
the necessary powers, the Councilshal, acting unanimous# on a proposalfrom the Commission,
and after consultng the European Parliament,take appropriatemeasures."
Following the Paris Summit of 1972, where the Member States explicitly decided to make full use of
Article 308 and to launch the Community into a variety of new fields, recourse to Article 308 as an
exclusive or partial legal basis rose dramatically This is another indication that the EU resembles a
federation rather than an international organization.

The Principle of Subsidiarity
Aside from the existence of the essential conditions of a federal system, there are other provisions in the
EC Treaty that make the EU resemble a federal state. An extremely important provision in this regard is
the principle of subsidiarity which has been introduced by Article 5 of the EC Treaty. According to this
principle, in areas that fall outside the exclusive competence of the Community,
"the Community shall take acton, in accordance with the prinarle of subsidiario, on/y if and
insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot he safficient# achieved by the Member
States, and can therefore, by reason of the scak and efects of the proposed action, be better
achieved y the Communiy."
It is clear from Article 5 that the application of the principle of subsidiarity involves a balancing test or a
42
proportionality analysis. The scale and effect of the proposed legislation by the EC have to be balanced
against an assessment of which level of government can sufficiently achieve the object of the action. The
centrality of the principle of subsidiarity can also be seen from the Treaty of the European Union

Articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty set out the tasks or purposes of the Community from which its competence is
derived, in rather open-textured language.
WEILER, stra note 4, at 41.

'

*

Id at 42.
*I

*2 In this sense, the principle of subsidiarity is different from the principle of residuary powers (left either to the
federal or the regional legislatures in most federal constitutions) as it does not involve a case of exclusive
jurisdiction.
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The Preamble of the TEU establishes the EU Member States' Resolution "to continue the

process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which deacsions are taken as close# as possible
to the digen, in accordance with theprinaple of subsdiariy'. Article F of the Treaty states that the EU "hall
resped the nahonal idenlies of the Member States, whose ysk s of gowrnment are founded on the pdnalepr of
demrtny", and that the EU itself shall respect fundamental rights "as the ,rsul fom the inshional
tradieions of the Member Srates, as generalrpnaples of the Communioy La.?'. By referring to the Treaty of the
European Union, in particular Article F, the ECJ can interpret and apply the principle of subsidiarity to
incorporate the key principles of federalism, i.e., diversity, democracy, and citizens' rights." In light of all
the above factors, it seems clear that the EU possesses at least some federal features.
Factors Inhibiting Further Integration
The primary factor against further integration is the democracy deficit in the EU. For instance, the United
States Constitution and the Preamble to the Indian Constitution both begin with the words "IWe, the
People", implying that the authority of the federal government emanates directly from the people. The
Treaty of Maastricht, on the other hand, opens with "His Majesf the King of Begian, Her Majesty, the
Queen of45Denmark..." implying that the parties to the Treaty are sovereign States, and not the people of
Europe. In terms of institutional structure, in the United States, not only the Constitution, but also
the institutions of the federal government - the Congress and the Presidency - derive their legitimacy
from the American people. In the EU, however, direct democracy at the European level is severely
restricted. The only real democratic legitimacy is achieved through the participation and influence of the
46
Member States' Parliaments. This has been a critical factor in influencing public opinion against further
integration. The Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, in its 1994 decision in the Maastricbt case,
while reserving for itself the power of judicial review over the treaty, clearly rejected the idea that the
treaty created the United States of Europe.

Conclusion: Relevance to the Indian Constitution
It appears from the above arguments that the EU structure is really a suigenesis one, with certain federal
features, and is unlikely in the foreseeable future to become a federation in the traditional sense. As stated at
the outset, one of the factors to be kept in mind while deciding whether an entity is a federation or not, is
the desire of the Member States to achieve union in certain areas. Since there is a democracy deficit in the EU,
there have been protests by the Member States against any further union. The improbability of any further

"

Seergrad Christian Kirchner. The Pdingk of SubuidAip in the Treai on Enpean Union: A Criique fon a Penpeckr of
Consfibdwnal Ewnomic, 6 TIANE J INtL & Casei. L 291 (1998); Paul D. Marquardt, Suhadiary and Sorerdgnty in the
Eopean Unles, 1B FORHAM b.'Irk L J. 616 (1994); Edward T. Swaine, Subsidsarit and Se-trniacrt Flnsmn at the
Esropan Court of Jaice, 41 1HIARV.
INT'l. L J. 1 (2000)
Edwards, supa note 15, at 543.
Steve J. Boorn, The Eawpean Union fer heAlastricht deasion: Will Germany bethe Vireinia of Europe?, 43 Ass. J. CoMp. L
177, 208 (1995).
aIda
210.
There are arnally three decisions of the Court, called Solonge L, II and HI respectively delivered in 1974, 1986 and
1994. Sohtse means "as long as" in German. The cases are so named because the Cour in each case held that the
treaty would be valid under German constitutional law as long as certain boundaries were not crossed- An
unofficial version of the Maasticbt judgement is available at 33 INT LEG. MAT. 388 (1994). See lur, Eropewns
lategraton: The Aaastichl adgmrnt of the Federal Consdidena Cnn of Germany, 17 FormoAn INTL. L. J. 411 (1994); Joachim
Wieland, Gernnyi in TheEenpen Union - the Maashubt Jdgment of the £Bndesrwfussngggeicht. 5 EuR. J. iNL L 259

(1994).
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integration in the near future is also strengthened by the decision of the German Federal Constitutional
Court, according to which predominance is to be given to German national law, as opposed to EU law. All
this isevidence of a reluctance to give up sovereignty in areas over and above what has already been seceded.
Therefore, despite the decisions given by the ECJ, and the existence of a European Parhament, in the
absence of the Member States' desire to move beyond a monetary union to a closer union in terms of unity
of political systems, laws, and a supranational political authority, the EU remains un-federal, and is unlikely
to move away from this stalemate in the near future.
The Indian Constitution has been variously characterized as federal, quasi-federal, statutorily decentralized,
etc. One charge that could be levelled against the Indian Constitution is that it is too centralized, and that
the way it works in practice takes away even the minimum powers that the states have under the
Constitution. The way in which European integration has taken place, and the process by which the EU
Treaty and its interpretation by the ECJ has helped resolve the conflicting demands of the Member States,
can prove instructive to the working of the Indian Constitution.
The main motivating factor behind European Integration has been economic development. This has been
supplemented by forces working towards integration, like political leaders and business interest groups.
The economic factor has been strong enough to persuade Member States to compromise on certain
domestic policy issues. It would be useful for India to look afresh at what the motivating factor for its
integration was, and see if it still exists. The process of India's integration was both a reaction to and a result
of the British Raj. Before the arrival of the British, there was no entity known as India. What is known as
India, today, was essentially a geographical mass consisting of small kingdoms. The British unified these
disparate territories under a common political, legal, and administrative system. They also established
means of communication and transport. This led to the fostering of a common sense of identity, and also
led to the creation of the image of the British as a common oppressor. The leaders of the Independence
Movement also worked to consciously create and foster a sense of belonging to a common entity called
India. Therefore, Indian integration was essentially of a political and defensive character.
India has always been besieged by problems that go to the root of its federal structure and system of
government. It is possible to observe that the reasons for Indian integration seem to be continuously
challenged, from the rise of separatist movements and increasing demands for separate statehood.
Keeping this scenario in mind, it may be advantageous to assess how far the economic factor would serve as
an impetus to a stronger federation. Secondly, the principle of subsidiarity enunciated in Article 5 of the
European Treaty can find place in the working of the Indian Constitution. This is with respect to both the
main objective of the principle - a test of balance and proportionality being applied to all the actions of the
centre taken under either express or implied powers and the interpretation of the principle, which includes
in its ambit respect for diversity democracy, and fundamental freedoms. These should occupy a prominent
place in assessing the actions of the central government and legislature, especially to contain its
encroachment upon the legislative field of the constituent states. Therefore, even though the EU has
emerged as a suigeneisorganization, it has certain federal characteristics that may be useful tools to better
understand and rationalize the working of the Indian Constitution.
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factor has been the inspiration behind almost all instances of any kind of political unification.
This stands true for two of the most successful instances of political unification, namely, the United States of
America and the unification of Germany by Bismarck. The most recent example of this is the EU.
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